In this paper we propose exact solution methods for a bilevel uncapacitated lot-sizing problem with backlogs. This is an extension of the classical uncapacitated lot-sizing problem with backlogs, in which two autonomous and self-interested decision makers constitute a twoechelon supply chain. The leader buys items from the follower in order to meet external demand at lowest cost. The follower also tries to minimize its costs. Both parties may backlog. We study the leader's problem, i.e., how to determine supply requests over time to minimize its costs in view of the possible actions of the follower. We develop two mixed-integer linear programming reformulations, as well as cutting planes to cut off feasible, but suboptimal solutions. We compare the reformulations on a series of benchmark instances.
Introduction
This paper focuses on a bilevel lot-sizing model in a two-level supply chain. The problem involves two self-interested decision makers, acting sequentially. The upper level, the leader , faces a time varying external demand that he wants to serve at a minimum cost. In order to meet the demand, he requests supplies from the lower level decision maker, the follower . The follower in turn tries to meet the requests at a minimum cost. Backlogging is possible at both levels. However, when the follower backlogs some of the requests, the backlogging cost is payed as a penalty to the leader, which reduces the leader's costs. While the follower's problem is a single-item uncapacitated lot-sizing problem with backlogging, the leader's problem is a more complex one, as it has to anticipate the late deliveries along with the corresponding penalties of the follower. Moreover, a late delivery from the follower may result in backlogging some of the leader's demands.
While most of the operations research literature investigates lot-sizing models with a single decision maker, it is widely recognized that the lotsizing decisions of autonomous partners in the supply chain mutually affect each other. Recently, new approaches have been investigated to fill this gap: integrated models with the objective of minimizing the total cost by centralized planning [26] , and coordination mechanisms for driving the selfinterested partners towards optimal performance on the system level without giving up autonomy or data privacy [2, 9] . In this paper we pursue a different approach based on bilevel optimization.
In applications, the leader may correspond to a retailer who faces external demand. The follower may be a supplier of the retailer. Alternatively, in a production/distribution problem, hierarchical planning is carried out by different departments of an enterprise. The logistics department is the leader who faces the customers' demands, and the manufacturing department produces the final products at a minimum cost.
Illustrative example. There are n = 10 time periods. The leader's fixed production cost, and the marginal production, holding and backlogging costs are f 1 = 100, p 1 = 1, h 1 = 6, and g 1 = 18, respectively, in all periods. The cost parameters of the follower are f 2 = 492, p 2 = 1, h 2 = 5, and g 2 = 6. Table 1 presents an optimal solution for this instance of the bilevel lotsizing problem. The columns of the table are indexed by the time periods 1 through 10. The rows depict the external demand d 1 t , the supply requests sent to the follower δ t , the supply received from the follower x 1 t , and the stocking and backlogging quantities, s 1 t and r 1 t , respectively, of the leader; and the production plan x 2 t , the stocking and backlogging quantities, s 2 t and r 2 t , respectively, of the follower. Notice that the leader never backlogs in this example. Moreover, the external demand d 1 t in periods t = 2, 7, 9 is satisfied partly from production and partly from stock, i.e., s 1 t−1 + x 1 t = d 1 t . This distinguishes the leader's problem from the uncapacitated lot-sizing problem, which always admits an optimal solution such that the demand of a period is uniquely served either from production, or from stock, or from backlog.
By a clever choice of the supply requests, the leader may prevent, or enforce backlogging at the follower. For instance, in time period 1, the leader inflates demand (82 instead of the external demand 71) in order to prevent the follower from backlogging, which would cause expensive late deliveries for the leader as well. To prevent backlogging, an amount of f 2 /g 2 = 492/6 = 82 is needed. On the other hand, the leader moves some demand from period 6 to period 5. The supply requests for period 5 is then the maximum amount that does not trigger production at the follower. To summarize, by early demands the leader may obtain extra backlog compensation, which decreases its costs.
Main contributions and structure of the paper. We propose two mixed integer linear programming formulations for solving the bilevel lot-sizing problem. The two formulations differ in the modeling of the follower's optimality conditions. The first formulation is based on a polyhedral characterization of the optimal solutions of the parametric uncapacitated lot-sizing problem with backlogs, where the parameters are the demands. The second model is derived from a shortest path formulation of the follower's problem. We also provide new inequalities to cut off suboptimal solutions of uncapacitated lotsizing problems with backlogs. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt for solving bilevel lot-sizing problems to optimality. Moreover, the technique of expressing the follower's optimality conditions without referring to complementarity conditions is new.
Structure of the paper. The related literature is surveyed in Section 2. The necessary background in lot-sizing with backlogs is recapitulated in Section 3. The bilevel lot-sizing problem is formally defined in Section 4. The two MIP models are presented in Section 5. New bounds on variables and cutting planes for strengthening the linear relaxation of the parametric ULSB problem are presented in Section 6. Finally, the approaches are assessed in computation experiments in Section 7, and conclusions are drawn in Section 8.
Related literature 2.1 Lot-sizing
Fundamental results on dynamic lot-sizing models were published in [41] , and [43] . These papers consider uncapacitated lot-sizing models where the deterministic, time varying demand is known in advance over a finite planning horizon. Over the past decades the basic models have been extended by production capacities and various side constraints, for an overview see e.g., [3, 30, 33] . Albeit dynamic programming is still the most efficient method for solving the tractable cases [29, 40, 41, 43] , they have been com-plemented by linear programming formulations for describing the convex hull of feasible solutions, see e.g., [4, 5, 31, 32, 34, 39, 25] . In particular, Küçükyavuz and Pochet [25] have given a complete description of the feasible solutions of the uncapacitated lot-sizing problem with backlogs (ULSB) in the space of original problem variables. Many times, it is easier to work with extended formulations, when new variables and constraints are introduced to obtain the linear formulation. The modeling of various features in lot-sizing by mixed-integer programs (MIP) are investigated in e.g., [7, 11] . As further extensions, different lot-sizing and scheduling models, including small-bucket and large-bucket, discrete and continuous time formulations, as well as single-and multi-level models are presented in [16, 30] .
Lot-sizing in supply chains
The need for studying the interacting lot-sizing decisions of multiple autonomous parties in a supply chain is widely recognized. One of the possible approaches is integration, when the different parties jointly solve the interrelated planning problems, see e.g., [26] for an overview, and [1, 19, 29] for applications. Important recent results in integrated planning include the paper [19] , which investigates the case of serial chains, constrained capacities, and concave cost functions, and introduces a dynamic program whose running time is polynomial when the number of levels in the chain is fixed. A dynamic program that runs in O(n 2 log n) time, and a tight extended formulation is presented in [29] for uncapacitated two-level lot-sizing, and a formulation is derived for the multi-item, multi-client case. [20] developed efficient methods for solving the integrated production and transportation planning problem under various assumptions.
A drawback of integration is the mutual sharing of all the planning relevant information, which is sometimes unrealistic. A game theoretic approach alleviates this burden by using coordination mechanisms between the parties to drive the supply chain towards a system-wide optimal performance [2, 9] . The decentralized planning, integrated, coordinated, and bilevel approaches to the same lot-sizing problem in a two-player supply chain are compared in [23] . In particular, an enumeration based method is proposed for the bilevel lot-sizing problem with backlogs, but it works only on problem instances with at most 10 time periods.
Bilevel programming
Bilevel programming addresses decision and optimization problems whose outcome is determined by the interplay of two self-interested decision makers who decide sequentially. The first decision maker, the so-called leader, is assumed to have a complete knowledge of the second decision maker's, the follower's problem and parameters. Therefore, to optimize its own objective function, the leader must consider the response that it can expect from the follower. Bilevel optimization problems usually have two variants. In the optimistic case, if the follower has multiple optimal solutions, the leader can pick one which is the most advantageous for him. The pessimistic case is just the opposite, i.e., if the follower has several optimal solutions for a set of parameters, the leader assumes that the least advantageous will be realized. In that case the leader's objective is to minimize the maximum of its objective function value over the optimal solutions of the follower.
The motivation for bilevel programming stems from economic game theory. In a two-player Stackelberg game two competing firms, the market leader and a follower company, for example a new entrant, produce equivalent goods. The firms decide their production quantities sequentially, which together determine the market price, with the aim of maximizing their own profit [37] . The basic modeling and solution techniques in bilevel programming are presented in [13] . A review of applicable solution methods for various classes of bilevel programs is given in [10] , whereas reformulations of continuous bilevel optimization problems into single-level problems are discussed in [14] . A combinatorial perspective on bilevel problems is presented in [28] . Recent development in solution methods are presented in e.g., [15, 17, 38] .
Related applications of bilevel programming
Despite the advances in generic solution methods, up to now, the literature of bilevel approaches to lot-sizing and planning problems in supply chains is rather scarce. The few works in this field include the paper of [12] , where a supply chain of multiple parties is studied, and a heuristic solution method is proposed for finding locally optimal solution at each party. The production planning problem of a pharmaceutical company with two machines and n products is investigated in [27] . The leader is interested in minimizing the setup costs on the two machines incurred by changing products between periods, and decides which product to produce on which machine, whereas the follower solved n lot-sizing problems without backlogs connected by capacity constraints. The proposed heuristic method governs the assignment of lots to machines, and uses a MIP solver for solving the follower's problem exactly. [36] introduced a bilevel programming model to a production and distribution planning problem in a supply chain, where the follower's problem can be modeled by linear programs, whose parametric solutions can be computed efficiently. A similar production and distribution problem subject to uncertainties is formulated as a probabilistic bilevel problem in [35] . [42] investigates the problem of coordinated planning in a supply chain under hard service time requirements.
The application of bilevel programming to the coordination of multidivisional organizations has been proposed in [6] . The upper level problem is that of the corporate unit, who wishes to set the internal transfer prices among the divisions in such a way that the local optimal decisions of the divisions coincide with the corporate optimum. Bilevel approaches to different production scheduling problems are discussed in [8, 21, 22, 24] .
Background in uncapacitated lot-sizing with backlogs
In this section we recapitulate fundamental results on uncapacitated lotsizing problems with backlogs (ULSB). The problem with a linear cost function can be stated as a mixed-integer linear program:
where
In this formulation, p t , f t , h t , r t , and δ t denote the marginal production cost, the fixed production cost, the marginal inventory holding cost, the marginal backlogging cost, and the demand in time period t, respectively; and M = n t=1 δ t is a big constant. The variables x t , s t , and r t represent the production, the stocking and backlogging quantities, respectively, and the binary variables y t indicate whether there is production in period t or not. Let X BL denote the set of feasible solutions of ULSB:
Firstly, recall a basic structural property of ULSB:
The extreme points of conv(X BL ) are of the following structure: there exists 2q
and y i j = 1 for j = 1, . . . , q.
• x t = 0 and y t ∈ {0, 1} for t ∈ {1, . . . , n} \ {i 1 , . . . , i q }
• r t = t j δ k , and s t = 0 for t ∈ { j , . . . , i j − 1} for all j = 1, . . . , q.
• s t = j+1 −1 k=t+1 δ k , and r t = 0 for t ∈ {i j , . . . , j+1 − 1} for all j = 1, . . . , q.
Moreover, conv(X BL ) has n − 1 extreme rays, one for each t = 1, . . . , n − 1: s t = r t = 1, s j = r j = 0 for j = t, x j = y j = 0 for all j = 1, . . . , n. The following extended formulation is based on solving ULSB by computing a shortest path in an appropriately defined network (see Figure 1) . The network consists of 3n + 1 nodes. For each time period t = 1, . . . , n, there are 3 nodes, t, t , t , and an extra node (n + 1). There is an arc from t to t , from t to t , an arc from t to k for t < k ≤ n, and an arc from t to k with t < k ≤ n + 1. The associated flow variables are v tt , z tt , v kt , and w t,k−1 , respectively. In addition, an extra variable y t is associated with arc (t , t ) for each t, to model the fixed cost of production in (1) .
The optimum value of ULSB equals the optimum value of the following mathematical program.
t=k h t δ t+1, for 1 ≤ k < ≤ n, and δ k, = t=k δ t for 1 ≤ k ≤ ≤ n. Moreover, v, w, y, and z take integral values in any basic solution.
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Clearly, if h t + g t ≥ 0 for all t (i.e., the optimum is finite), then the variables λ t can be dropped from the above formulation.
Problem formulation
We consider a supply chain that provides a single item to its customers. It consists of two decision makers, a leader and a follower. The leader faces a time varying deterministic external demand d 1 t , t = 1, . . . , n, over a discrete time horizon of n time periods. Departing from the external demands, the leader requests a supply of δ t , t = 1, . . . , n, units from the follower. The follower in turn solves a lot-sizing problem with demands δ t set by the leader. It generates a production plan that specifies for each period t of the planning horizon the amount to be produced. In those time periods t, when a positive amount x 2 t > 0 is produced, a fixed cost of f 2 t and a variable cost of p 2 t x 2 t are incurred. The amount x 2 t is used to serve the request δ t along with backlogged requests from previous periods; and the remaining quantity, if any, is kept on stock to satisfy future requests. The associated marginal costs are
A delivery of x 1δ t ≥ 0 : supply requested by the leader in period t x 2 t ≥ 0 : production quantity of the follower in period t s 2 t ≥ 0 : stock of the follower after period t
In this formulation M is a big constant with M = n t=1 d 1 t . The objective is to minimize the leader's total cost minus the penalty received from the follower for backlogged supply. The constraints (11)- (17) and (19)- (23) represent lot-sizing problems with backlogging with the additional constraints (12) , (14) and (24) . Namely, (12) connects the supply by the follower in period t to the production of the leader in the same period, see equation (9) , whereas by (14) and (24) , the delivery is x 1 t = 0 if the follower backlogs in period t. Moreover, the optimality condition (18) expresses that the follower chooses its optimal production plan with respect to the quantities requested by the leader.
To avoid pathological cases, we want to ensure that r 2
MIP models
In this section we describe two mathematical programs for solving bilevel lot-sizing problems. In both MIPs we introduce new variables and con-straints to describe the connection between the supply requests δ t and the corresponding optimal solutions of the follower. First, we argue that we may assume that the follower's optimal solution is an extreme point solution of ULSB.
Lemma 2 If the bilevel lot-sizing problem admits an optimal solution, then it admits one in which the follower's solution is an extreme point solution of ULSB.
Proof We will prove that if the bilevel optimization problem admits an optimal solution, then it has one with r (21) in any feasible solution, so for t = n we only have to verify x 2 t s 2 t−1 = 0.
• Since g 2 t + h 2 t > 0, r 2 t s 2 t = 0 in any optimal solution of the follower, for t = 1, . . . , n − 1.
• Now we prove x 2 t r 2 t = 0 and s 2 t−1 r 2 t = 0 for all t. Namely, rearranging (19) gives x 2 t + s 2 t−1 = δ t + r 2 t−1 − r 2 t + s 2 t . Suppose r 2 t > 0, then by the previous point, s 2 t = 0, and x 1 t = 0 by (14) . Since x 1 t = δ t +r 2 t−1 −r 2 t by (12), we have x 2 t + s 2 t−1 = δ t + r 2 t−1 − r 2 t = x 1 t = 0. Since x 2 t , s 2 t−1 ≥ 0, the claim follows.
• Finally, we prove that the optimal solution of the follower can be transformed such that s 2 t−1 x 2 t = 0 for all t, while maintaining r 2 t s 2 t = 0, s 2 t−1 r 2 t = 0, and x 2 t r 2 t = 0 for all t. Namely, let t * be the smallest index with s 2 t−1 x 2 t > 0 in the optimal solution of the follower picked by the leader. Then there exists < t * with s 2 −1 = 0, and x 2 ≥ s 2 ≥ · · · ≥ s 2 t * −1 > 0, where the inequalities follow from the choice of t * and , and from (19) . Since the solution is optimal, we have p 2 + t * −1
We transform the optimal solution of the follower by decreasing x 2 , and s 2 through s 2 t * −1 by λ, and increasing x 2 t * by λ. The new solution is still optimal for the follower, and this transformation has no impact at all on the feasibility or optimality of the solution of the leader.
We call a feasible solution of the bilevel lot-sizing problem extreme point solution if the follower's solution is an extreme point solution of ULSB. To restrict the follower's optimal solutions to extreme point solutions of ULSB, we add a new set of constraints to the follower's problem:
where we let β 2 n = 0 to simplify notation. Notice that s 2 t−1 ≥ 0 and (26) imply y 2 t + β 2 t ≤ 1. Proposition 2 Any optimal solution of the follower satisfying (26) is an extreme point solution of ULSB.
Proof We clearly have r 2 t s 2 t = 0 for all t in any optimal solution of the follower by Assumption 1. Now, if r 2 t > 0, then β 2 t = 1 by (24), and thus s 2 t−1 = y 2 t = 0 by (26) , and then x 2 t = 0 by (20) . Likewise, if x 2 t > 0, then y 2 t = 1 by (20), whence s 2 t−1 = β 2 t = 0 by (26) , and then r 2 t = 0 by (24) . Finally, if s 2 t−1 > 0, then y 2 t = β 2 t = 0 by (26) , and thus x 2 t = r 2 t = 0 by (20) and (24), respectively. 2
Formulation MIP-1
Our first formulation is based on a MIP model whose feasible solutions are those (x 2 , y 2 , s 2 , r 2 , δ) vectors such that (x 2 , y 2 , s 2 , r 2 ) is an optimal extreme point solution of the follower's ULSB problem with demands (supply requests) δ t ≥ 0 such that n t=1 δ t = K, where K = n t=1 d 1 t is a fixed constant. Let OP 2 be the set of these vectors. Firstly, we give an extended formulation for OP 2 , and then we will use it in our first formulation for the bilevel lot-sizing problem.
To get an extended formulation for OP 2 , we express the optimality conditions of the follower by connecting a primal-, and the dual of an extended formulation of ULSB by a single constraint. As primal formulation, we choose the objective function in (18) subject to the constraints (19)- (25) . Let Z U LSB (δ) denote the optimum value of the follower for supply requests δ ≥ 0. As for the dual, we need a linear program whose feasible solutions provide lower bounds on Z U LSB (δ), its optimum value is Z U LSB (δ) for any δ ≥ 0, and the δ t occur in the right hand side only. To get such a linear formulation, we start out from the shortest path formulation (7)-(8) of [31] in which the demand occurs in the objective function. Notice that this linear program always has a finite optimum for any fixed δ ≥ 0. Since f 2 t ≥ 0, there always exists an optimal solution with z tt = y t . Hence, z tt can be substituted out. Taking the dual of the resulting linear program, the δ t occur only in the right hand side of the constraints. The dual variables are φ 2 t , φ 2 t , and φ 2 t for t = 1, . . . , n, and to simplify notation we define φ 2 n+1 = 0.
subject to
Moreover, by the strong duality of linear programming we have Z U LSB (δ) = D SP (δ) for any fixed δ ≥ 0. We have the following:
Lemma 3 (x 2 ,ŷ 2 ,ŝ 2 ,r 2 ,δ) ∈ OP 2 if and only if n t=1 δ t = K, and there existsφ 2 such that (x 2 ,ŷ 2 ,ŝ 2 ,r 2 ,β,δ,φ 2 ) satisfies the constraints (19)- (25), (26) , (28) , and the equation
Proof First suppose (x 2 ,ŷ 2 ,ŝ 2 ,r 2 ,δ) ∈ OP 2 . Letφ 2 denote an optimal solution of the dual linear program (27)- (28), and letβ 2 t = 1 ifr 2 t > 0, and 0 otherwise. Since (x 2 ,ŷ 2 ,ŝ 2 ,r 2 ) is an optimal solution of the ULSB problem with respect toδ, we have Z U LSB (δ) = D SP (δ). Hence, (x 2 ,ŷ 2 ,ŝ 2 ,r 2 ,β 2 ,δ,φ 2 ) satisfies all of the constraints (19)- (25), (26), (28), and (29) .
Conversely, suppose (x 2 ,ŷ 2 ,ŝ 2 ,r 2 ,β 2 ,δ,φ 2 ) satisfies all of the constraints (19)- (25), (26), (28), (29) and n t=1 δ t = K. Clearly, (x 2 ,ŷ 2 ,ŝ 2 ,r 2 ) is a feasible solution of the follower's problem of valueφ 2 1 , since it satisfies (29) . Therefore, we have
, where the first inequality follows from (29) . Since (x 2 ,ŷ 2 ,ŝ 2 ,r 2 ,β 2 ,δ,φ 2 ) also satisfies (26), Proposition 2 implies (x 2 ,ŷ 2 ,ŝ 2 ,r 2 ,δ) ∈ OP 2 . 2
Let OP 2 ext be the set of those (x 2 , y 2 , r 2 , s 2 , β 2 , δ, φ 2 ) vectors that satisfy the constraints (19)- (25), (26), (28), (29), and n t=1 δ t = K. We argue that some of the inequalities satisfied by all feasible solutions of the bilevel lot-sizing problem are implied by others.
Proposition 3 Inequalities (14) always hold if the follower's solution is an extreme point solution.
Proof In an extreme point solution of the follower's problem, r 2 t > 0 implies r 2 t = δ t + r 2 t−1 by Proposition 1. Since (12) holds if and only if x 1 τ = δ 2 τ + r 2 τ −1 − r 2 τ for all τ , r 2 t > 0 implies x 1 t = 0. Hence, (14) is superfluous. 2 Now we are ready to describe our first MIP for solving the bilevel lotsizing problem. (13), (15)- (17), (19)- (25), (26), (28), (29) 
MIP-1 : min
We can easily project any feasible solution of MIP-1 to a solution of the bilevel-lot-sizing problem by discarding the values of variables φ 2 .
Lemma 4 There is a one-to-one correspondence between the extreme point feasible solutions of the bilevel lot-sizing problem and that of MIP-1:
(i) Any feasible solution of MIP-1 can be projected into a feasible solution of the bilevel lot-sizing problem of the same value.
(ii) Conversely, any feasible extreme point solution of the bilevel lot-sizing problem can be extended to a feasible solution of MIP-1 of the same value.
Proof
(i) Let (x 1 ,ȳ 1 ,s 1 ,r 1 ,δ,x 2 ,ȳ 2 ,s 2 ,r 2 ,β 2 ,φ 2 ) be a feasible solution of MIP-1. Firstly, we have to verify that (x 2 ,ȳ 2 ,s 2 ,r 2 ) is an optimal, extreme point solution of the follower with respect toδ. Note that (11), (12) and (15) imply
ext . Since (x 2 ,ȳ 2 ,s 2 ,r 2 ,β 2 ,δ,φ 2 ) satisfies the conditions of Lemma 3, (x 2 ,ȳ 2 ,s 2 ,r 2 ) is an optimal solution of the follower for demandδ. Since (26) is satisfied, by Proposition 2 it is an extreme point solution of ULSB. Hence, by Proposition 3, inequalities (14) are satisfied. Therefore, (x 1 ,ȳ 1 ,s 1 ,r 1 ,δ,x 2 ,ȳ 2 ,s 2 ,r 2 ,β 2 ) is a feasible solution of Bilevel-LS of the same objective function value as that of MIP-1.
(ii) Given a feasible extreme point solution (
of Bilevel-LS, since it is optimal for the follower, (x 2 ,ȳ 2 ,s 2 ,r 2 ) is an optimal extreme point solution of the follower's ULSB problem with respect to demandsδ t . Therefore, there exists a solutionφ 2 of (28) which satisfies (29) . Hence, (x 1 ,ȳ 1 ,s 1 ,r 1 ,δ,x 2 ,ȳ 2 ,s 2 ,r 2 ,β 2 ,φ 2 ) is a feasible solution of MIP-1. Clearly, the value of the solution of Bilevel-LS, and that of the corresponding solution of MIP-1 are the same. 2
Theorem 1
The bilevel lot-sizing problem always has a finite optimum, and the optimum value is that of MIP-1.
Proof We argue that MIP-1 always has a finite optimum. The statement then follows from Lemma 4. Clearly, the objective function value is bounded from below by −M n t=1 ((p 1nodes i, k with i ≤ k, there are k − i + 1 parallel edges (i, j, k), i ≤ j ≤ k, all directed from node i to node k. The length of an edge (i, j, k) is c i,j,k = a j,i + f j + p j δ i,k + b j,k (for definitions, see Section 3). Clearly, for fixed δ t values, a shortest path from node 1 to node n provides an optimal solution for the follower's lot-sizing problem. In our second MIP formulation, we introduce one binary variable for each edge of the directed graph. Let α ijk indicate that the requests δ t in the interval i, . . . , k are satisfied by production in period j ∈ {i, . . . , k}. If α ijk = 1, then s 2 i−1 = s 2 k = 0, and likewise r 2 i−1 = r 2 k = 0. In addition, we introduce a variable φ t for each node t ∈ {1, . . . , n} to represent the length of the shortest path from node 0 to node t, and we also set φ 0 = 0. Now we are ready to describe the second MIP formulation for solving the bilevel lot-sizing problem.
MIP-2 : min
2 t subject to the constraints (11)- (17), (24) and
Only the constraints (30)- (34) are new. Clearly, t is a backlogging period if and only if there exists α i,j,k = 1 with i ≤ t < j. Hence, β 2 t = 1 if and only if t is a backlogging period by (30) . Constraints (31) ensure that for each period t precisely one edge of the directed graph is selected to start, finish, or cross it, whence, those edges in a feasible solution with α i,j,k = 1 constitute a directed path from node 1 to node n. The edge lengths and node potentials are related in (31). However, if α i,j,k = 1, then equality must hold by (32) .
) is a very big constant to accommodate the maximum follower cost over all possible requests of the leader. These two equations together ensure that for any 1 − n path π determined by the variables α i,j,k , the δ t must be chosen such that π is a shortest 1 − n path with respect to the arc lengths c i,j,k . MIP-2 is intuitively a simpler, and a more natural formulation of the bilevel lot-sizing problem than MIP-1. But as we will see in the computational evaluation, it is harder to solve to optimality than MIP-1. A reason why MIP-2 is weak are the constraints (33) , which involve the very big constant M .
Valid inequalities on the optimal solutions of ULSB
In this section we derive valid inequalities for the extended formulation of OP 2 (cf. Section 5.1). Since our results are valid for ULSB in general, we will omit the superscript 2. Let Z t denote the minimum cost incurred by backlogging a unit of production from period t to a later period, that is
Notice that Z t does not carry the fixed cost of production.
Lemma 5
The backlogged quantities r t in any extreme point optimal solution of ULSB satisfy
Proof Let (x, y, s, r) be any optimal extreme point solution. We may assume that it satisfies the condition of Lemma 1. If r t = 0, then the inequality trivially holds. So assume that a positive amount of r t is backlogged in period t. Then, the total cost associated with this amount is at least Z t r t , which corresponds to the variable cost of backlogging it until some period u, and producing it in period u. On the other hand, if this amount were produced in period t instead, then the associated cost would be at most f t + p t r t . Hence, if Z t r t > f t + p t r t , the solution is not optimal. Namely, let k > t be the first period after t in which a positive amount x t > 0 is produced (since r t > 0, such a time period exists), and since it is an extreme point solution, x k ≥ r t . Then we define another solution (x , y , s , r ) of smaller cost: x j = x j for j = k and j = t, x t = r t , and x k = x k − r t ; r j = r j − r t for j = t, . . . , k − 1, and r j = r j otherwise; y t = 1, y k = 1 if and only if x k > 0, and y j = y j otherwise, s = s. Clearly, this is a feasible solution. Let C denote the cost of solution (x , y , s , r ) and C that of solution (x, y, s, r). We can express the change in the objective function value as follows:
Here, the first equation follows from the fact that y t = 0, since r t > 0, and the definitions; the second inequality from the definition of Z t and from the assumption f k ≥ 0; the third inequality from the assumption Z t r t > f t +p t r t .
Therefore, in an optimal solution, we must have Z t r t ≤ f t + p t r t , which is equivalent to the statement of the Lemma. 2 A similar statement can be made about stocking costs. Let S t denote the minimum cost incurred by stocking a unit of production from some period u < t until period t, that is S t = min 1≤u<t (p u + t−1 v=u h v ). Notice that S t does not carry the fixed cost of production.
Lemma 6 The stock levels s t in any optimal extreme point solution of ULSB satisfy
The proof is analogous to that of Lemma 5. We can apply these bounds to the follower's problem, and we will call (35) and (36) the bounds R2 and S2 , respectively. By using the extended formulation for the optimal solutions of ULSB derived in Section 5.1, we can derived additional valid inequalities.
are valid for OP ext .
Proof We verify that any optimal extreme point solution (x,ȳ,s,r,β,δ,φ) in OP ext satisfies (37) . First suppose t ∈ W withȳ t = 1, i.e., production occurs in time period t. Thenr t =s t−1 = 0. Moreover,φ satisfies the constraints
Summing up these inequalities shows that (37) is satisfied. Now suppose t ∈ W withȳ t = 0. Sincex t = 0,r t +s t−1 ≥δ t . Notice thatφ satisfies φ t − φ (t+1) ≤ a t+1,t = p t+1 δ t + g t δ t by assumption. Hencē
where the last inequality follows fromr t +s t−1 ≥δ t and from t ∈ W . 2
Finally, we mention that the complete linear description of ULSB provided in [25] cannot be applied directly to strengthening the linear formulation of OP 2 , because all the inequalities involve terms of the form δ k, y t , which are nonlinear if the δ t are variables instead of constants.
Computational experiments
with n ≥ 25, as reflected by the smaller average and maximum computation times for n = 25, 30, 50. In addition, among the largest instances (n = 50), 69 is solved to optimality when the bounds R2 and S2 are applied, in contrast to the 58 instances solved without these bounds. However, even for large instances the average upper bound gap of 1.8%, and the average computation time of 618 CPU seconds is quite reasonable. The cuts (37) are only useful for instances with n ≥ 40, and in fact, there is a slight improvement in the average values for n = 40 only. The reason is that the computational effort of checking the violation of these cuts is not balanced by their strength. Model MIP-2 could solve only the smallest instances, with n = 10, while it found only a few optimal solutions for medium-sized problems (18 or 57 optimal solutions by MIP-2 and MIP-2B, respectively, for n = 15), and timed out on all of the larger instances. Even for the instances that could be solved, the computation times were an order of magnitude larger than with MIP-1. For the instances not solved to optimality, the model without the additional cuts, MIP-2, finished with an extremely large lower bound gap: the maximum gap was nearly 3000%, while the average gap was above 1500% for n = 20. Adding the bounds R2 to the model could significantly improve both the upper and the lower bounds, resulting in gaps often 3 (LB) or 15 (UB) times smaller for MIP-2B than for MIP-2 with n = 20, but still considerably weaker than the results achieved by the variants of MIP-1.
Conclusions
In this paper we have developed exact solutions methods for the bilevel uncapacitated lot-sizing problem with backlogs. The novelty of our approach lies in the modeling of the optimality conditions of the follower by using a primal and a dual formulation for the same problem connected by a single equation, and thus we can avoid the use of extra binary variables to model complementarity conditions which is a standard technique in bilevel optimization.
A detailed polyhedral study of the the convex hull of OP 2 , or OP 2 ext is subject to future work. The parametric solution of ULSB may have further important applications.
The capacitated version of the problem is even more difficult, even if the follower's problem is a constant capacity lot-sizing problem with backlogs (CC-LSB). Although CC-LSB is polynomially solvable, to apply the technique of this paper, one needs an (extended) formulation for CC-LSB in which the demands occur in the objective function. The extended formulation of [39] is not appropriate for our purposes, since the demands occur in the right hand side.
Finally, our approach may be suitable for solving other bilevel optimization problems where the follower's problem admits an extended formulation in which the parameters imposed by the leader occur only in the objective function, and the optimal solutions have nice structural properties.
